This paper adapts intra-firm influence strategies to an inter-firm context. In the process it retests the relationship between coercive influence strategies and supplier performance. Qualitative data is drawn from interviews with managers in the Australian Recruitment Industry. Contrary to predictions, the findings show that suppliers use coalitions and upward appeals to improve their performance in inter-firm relationships. This suggests that prior influence studies are not completely correct in their prediction of a negative relationship between coercive influence strategies and performance in inter-firm relationships. And, it suggests that there may be two types of coercive influence strategies in inter-firm relationships. There are coercive influence strategies that hinder supplier performance and there are coercive influence strategies that aid supplier performance. Keywords: Inter-Firm Relationships, Influence, Coercion
Contrary to predictions, the findings show that some coercive influence strategies are positively linked to supplier performance. We conclude with a discussion of the findings and their implications for theory and practice.
Literature Review
Inter-firm influence strategies are "the content and structure of the communications utilized by a source firm's personnel in their influence attempts with target firms" (Frazier & Summers, 1984, p.43) . They are the compliance-gaining tactics that channel members use to achieve desired actions. Much of the literature today, in terms of inter-firm influence strategies, has its foundations in the work of Frazier and Summers (1984) . These scholars were the first to identify and empirically test six inter-firm influence strategies, which they labeled as: promises (source certifies to extend specific rewards contingent on the target's compliance), threats (source informs the target that failure to comply will result in negative sanctions), legalistic pleas (source contends that target compliance is required by formal agreement), requests (source asks the target to act with no mention of subsequent sanctions requested or rewards), information exchange (source supplies information with no specific action requested or otherwise indicated) and recommendations (source stresses that specific target action is needed for the latter to achieve desired outcomes). Frazier and Summers (1984) dichotomized these strategies into those that sought to change the target's perception (requests, information exchange and recommendations) and those that sought to change the target's behavior (promises, threats, legal action).
Insert Table 1 about here As Table 1 shows, subsequent scholars built upon this framework by testing each of these strategies with dependent variables, such as performance. Early scholars (Frazier & Summers, 1986; Frazier & Rody, 1991) tested the effects of behavior changing (coercive strategies) and perception changing (non-coercive strategies) influence strategies on the performance of inter-firm relationships (including the likelihood of relationship dissolution and the presence of conflict). The findings of these studies show that supplier use of coercive influence strategies are negatively linked to buyer performance (Frazier & Summers, 1986 ) and relationship performance (Boyle & Dwyer, 1995) , while being positively linked to relationship dissolution (Frazier & Summers, 1986) and relationship conflict (Frazier & Rody, 1991) .
Insert Table 2 about here Around the early to mid 1990s influence scholars moved away from general studies on inter-firm influence (Frazier & Summers, 1984) , to studies on intra-firm influence, mostly between the buying centre/committee and a buying agent (Farrell & Shroder, 1996; McFarland, Challagalla, & Shervani, 2006) . Inter-firm influence strategies are differentiated from intra-firm influence strategies by the fact that intra-firm influence strategies have mostly been applied to the study of influence within firms, i.e. between a manager, subordinate and co-worker, while inter-firm influence strategies have mostly been applied to the study of influence between firms, i.e. between two or more firms in an inter-firm relationship. Intra-firm influence strategies can be divided into hard, soft and rational subsets (Kipnis & Schmidt, 1985) . Hard intra-firm influence strategies include pressure (using demands, threats, frequent checking, or persistent reminders), legitimating (seeking to establish the legitimacy of a request by claiming the authority to make it), upward appeals (invoking the authority and power of higher management), exchange (explicit or implicit offers by an agent to provide a favor or benefit to a target in return for doing what the agent requests) and coalitions (enlisting the aid or endorsement of other people to influence a target). Soft intra-firm influence strategies include ingratiation or friendliness (seeking to get a target in a good mood before making a request), consultation (seeking a target's participation in planning a strategy, activity, or change for which the target's support and assistance are desired), personal appeals (appealing to the target's feelings of loyalty and friendship) and inspirational appeals (making a request or proposal that arouses enthusiasm by appealing to a target's values, ideals, and aspirations). And, finally, rational strategies include rational persuasion (using logical arguments and factual evidence to persuade a target that a proposal or request is worthwhile) (Kipnis & Schmidt, 1985) . As Table 2 shows, the findings of these studies show a non-significant link between a supplier's uses of hard influence strategies and manifest influence within the buying center. Manifest influence is defined as the changes in purchase decision-related opinions that result from the individual's participation in a buying centre (Farrell & Shroder, 1996) . Of interest here is the level of congruity between the two sets of literatures on Tables 1 and 2 . While the inter-firm literature dichotomizes influence strategies into coercive and non-coercive strategies, the intra-firm literature divides influence strategies into hard, soft and rational strategies (Kipnis & Schmidt, 1985) . Additionally, the findings of the inter-firm and intra-firm literatures are not contradictory. Also of interest to this research is the fact that these two sets of literatures appear recently to be converging. As Table 1 shows, two inter-firm studies have already adapted and applied rational and soft intra-firm influence strategies to an inter-firm context (see Payan & Nevin, 2006; Payan & McFarland, 2006) . These show that reason (rational persuasion) and appeals to loyalty/friendship (personal appeal) are positively linked to compliance in inter-firm relationships. Problematically, an analysis of all the literature found on Tables 1 and 2 revealed two limitations in these studies. First, inter-firm influence scholars have not analyzed the effects of coercive and non-coercive influence strategies on the performance of suppliers. Second, most of the studies on Tables 1 or 2 did not collect data from a supplier. At a glance, the studies on Table 1 and 2 appear to provide supportive evidence of influence use based on the supplier's perspective. However, a review of each study's methodology revealed that only one study had actually interviewed a supplier (see McFarland et al., 2006) . All of the evidence on Tables 1 and 2 was gathered from buyer agents, i.e. sales people or other boundary spanning agents, employed by the buyer firm. In these studies, buyer agents were asked to name the influence strategies used by a supplier. Suppliers were never asked to state which influence strategies they found to be of use. Each study advanced several reasons for this avoidance of direct supplier interviews. Chief amongst these was 'lack of access.' In effect, car dealers are more accessible than car manufacturers. Lack of access forced researchers to concentrate most of their research efforts on surveying middle-buyers (dealers and distributors). The fact that soft intra-firm influence strategies have been adapted and applied to the study of influence at inter-firm level but hard intra-firm influence strategies have not been adapted and applied to the study of influence at an inter-firm level combined with the fact that the supplier's perspective has not been given significant research attention leaves a gap for any researcher.
Conceptual Analysis
The following conceptual analysis fills these gaps in the literature and continues the process of adaptation. The aim is to provide a unique perspective on influence use between firms.
Intra-Firm Influence Strategies
From the outset, it is important to mention that several authors have put forward lists of intra-firm influence strategies. All of which are appropriate for this study. As Table 3 shows, Kipnis, Schmidt, and Wilkinson (1980) were the first to measure categories of influence behavior and common reasons for making influence attempts within organizations. They were the first to identify the intra-firm influence strategies that people use to 'get their way'. The fact that Yukl and Falbe (1990) repeated Kipnis et al.'s (1980) study with some minor changes to methodology and two additions to the number of intra-firm influence strategies provides us with some assurance that both Kipnis et al.'s (1980) and Yukl and Falbe's (1990) lists are appropriate for this study. Yukl and Falbe's (1990) list therefore provides the basis for the influence strategies mentioned in this study. Yukl and Falbe's (1990) list of hard strategies includes pressure, exchange, coalitions and upward appeals.
Insert Table 3 about here 3.2 Inter-Firm Relationships This study examines influence within preferred supplier agreements. Within the context of these discussions preferred supplier agreements (known hereafter as PSAs) are defined as "relatively long term contractual commitment…often at arm's length and adversarial, pitting the customer against the vendor… (requiring) a buyer to maintain a list of qualified vendors…to attract maximum competition" (Webster, 1992, p. 7) . PSAs are based on competition. These agreements require buyers to maintain lists of qualified suppliers and for each supplier to bid for procurement. The idea is to attract as much competition as possible by pitting one supplier against all other suppliers on a supplier list (Corey, 1978; Spekman, 1988) . With PSAs, the battle is strongly fought on price, although, quality, delivery and technical support are also factors taken into account when approving suppliers. Buyers sometimes prefer these agreements because it allows them to retain some of the benefits associated with partnerships, i.e. an understanding of the buyer's business, while at the same time retaining the buyer's choice (Webster, 1992; Druker & Stanworth, 2001) .
Influence and Performance
As Table 1 shows, there is evidence of a link between influence and performance in inter-firm relationships (Frazier & Summers, 1986) . However, performance is an elusive concept. There are many ways to assess performance. For example, performance can be assessed in terms of performance satisfaction (Mohr & Spekman, 1994; Krishnan, Martin, & Noorderhaven, 2006) , financial outcomes (Lusch & Brown, 1996; Fryxell, Dooley, & Vryza, 2002) , completion time (Woolthuis, Hillebrand, & Nooteboom, 2005 ) and continuity of relationship (Noordeweir, John, & Nevin, 1990) . This study uses satisfaction to assess the performance of suppliers in PSAs. For the purposes of this study, satisfaction is defined as "a positive effective state resulting from the appraisal of all aspects of a firm's working relationship with another firm" (Anderson & Narus, 1984, p. 66) . Satisfaction is an affective judgment not an objective calculation. Satisfaction was chosen because it is a close proxy for many performance outcomes, including perceived effectiveness and lack of conflict/disagreement (Anderson & Narus, 1990) . Disagreements between partners tend to block the achievement of relationship goals, eliciting frustration and thereby causing feelings of unpleasantness or lack of satisfaction among partners (Anderson & Narus, 1990) . Satisfaction was also chosen because it is the performance measurement used by the majority of influence scholars investigating influence and performance. As Table 1 shows there are only three empirical studies directly or indirectly investigating influence and performance in inter-firm relationships (Frazier & Summers, 1986; Frazier & Rody, 1991; Boyle & Dwyer, 1995) . Of these three empirical studies, one uses satisfaction to assess performance in inter-firm relationships (Frazier & Summers, 1986) , another uses the degree to which inter-firm exchange activities are successfully planned and executed (Boyle & Dwyer, 1995) , while the final study uses satisfaction's proxy, conflict/harmony (Frazier & Rody, 1991) for the same purposes. Using satisfaction as a performance measurement allows us to replicate an important condition of these previous studies thus allowing some comparability between results.
Predictions
As the literature review shows, the literature currently contains two main limitations. First, scholars have not analyzed the effects of coercive influence strategies on the performance of suppliers. Second, prior inter-firm influence studies did not collect data from suppliers. Also, and at the same time, the literature is evolving. Intra-firm influence strategies are now being applied to the study of influence at inter-firm level. These factors created a rather perplexing problem for this research. Since we have no data about supplier use of coercive influence strategies and supplier performance and we have no data on the application of hard influence strategies at inter-firm level, the main problem faced by this research is that the predictions made in this study cannot be based directly on prior research but rather are inferred from it. 3.4.1 Inter-Firm Studies There are three empirical studies assessing the performance of firms in inter-firm relationships. The first was conducted in the late 1980s. Using a partial correlation analysis and a sample of 300 distributors, Frazier and Summers (1986) investigate the relationship between a dealer's perception of their manufacturer's power and the manufacturer's use of coercive and non-coercive influence strategies within the context of an automobile distribution channel. The findings show that a manufacturer's (supplier's) use of coercive influence strategies (promises, threats and legalistic pleas) has a negative effect on a dealer's (buyer's) performance. Performance is defined as the level of satisfaction exhibited by the dealer in the inter-firm relationship. The researchers also find that a manufacturer's use of coercive influence strategies has a positive effect on the likelihood of relationship dissolution. The findings indicate that the use of coercive influence strategies can lead to several problems in the relationship including, retaliation by the target, perceptions of the source as exploitative and target dissatisfaction with the exchange relationship prompting to a predisposition towards dissolving it. The second study was conducted in the early 1990s. Using a multivariate analysis and a sample of 300 distributors, Frazier and Rody (1991) investigate the relationship between non-coercive and coercive strategies and inter-firm power, latent conflict, manifest conflict and conflict resolution constructs within the context of an industrial products channel. The study shows that a supplier's and a distributor's use of coercive influence strategies (promises, threats and legalistic pleas) are positively linked to latent inter-firm conflict. Latent inter-firm conflict is defined as the extent to which the distributor agreed or disagreed with the supplier's point of view on important distributor decision issues. The study's findings indicate that tolerance for the use of coercive influence strategies among suppliers and distributors is low. Moreover, the use of coercive influence strategies by one firm is likely to be met by the use of coercive strategies by the other. And, the use of coercive strategies heightens the underlying state of incompatibility between the firms. The third study was conducted in the mid 1990s. Using a series of structural equation models and a sample of 314 distributors, Boyle and Dwyer (1995) investigate the relationship between influence use and relationship performance within the context of an industrial distribution channel. The findings show that non-coercive influence strategies (information exchange) have a positive effect on relationship performance, while coercive influence strategies (requests, legalistic pleas and threats) have a negative effect on it. Performance is defined as the degree to which inter-firm exchange activities are successfully planned and executed. The findings indicate that the use of coercive influence strategies tends to hinder the long-term performance of channel relationships. 3.4.2 Intra-Firm Studies There is only one empirical study assessing the effectiveness of intra-firm influence strategies. That study was conducted in the mid to late 1990s. Using a mix of correlation and factor analyses and a sample of 150 purchasing decisions, Farrell and Schroder (1996) investigate the effectiveness of seven intra-firm influence strategies in influencing the purchasing decision outcomes of a buying centre. The findings show that soft influence strategies (inspirational appeal and consultation) and rational influence strategies (rational persuasion), as used by advertising agencies, are positively linked to manifest influence within the buying centre, while hard influence strategies (coalitions, exchange, personal appeal and pressure), as used by advertising agencies, are non-significantly linked to manifest influence within the buying centre. Manifest influence is defined as the changes in purchase decision-related opinions that result from the individual's participation in a buying center. In line with previous studies, the findings indicate that strategies that attempt to intimidate, solicit or 'buy out' others tend to be ineffective in influencing others.
Summary
To summarize, this review finds that supplier use of coercive influence strategies is negatively linked to buyer performance (Frazier & Summers, 1986) and relationship performance (Boyle & Dwyer, 1995) , while being positively linked to relationship dissolution (Frazier & Summers, 1986 ) and inter-firm conflict (Frazier & Rody, 1991) , while, agent use of hard influence strategies is non-significantly linked to manifest influence (Farrell & Schroder, 1996) . Based on this evidence, we predict that supplier use of hard/coercive influence strategies is negatively linked to supplier performance. This prediction is summed up in the set of propositions found on Table 4 . Table 4 contains a summary of the above and also a list of all hard/coercive influence strategies, their definitions and predictions based on these classifications.
Insert Table 4 about here 3.5 Model of Influence Strategies Figure 1 proposes a negative relationship between hard/coercive influence strategies and supplier performance satisfaction.
Insert Figure 1 about here 4. Methodology This study adopts a discovery orientation approach (Creswell & Plano-Clark, 2006) . The discovery orientation is a phenomenological approach that allows researchers to uncover patterns not previously studied in confirmatory oriented research. The discovery orientation was selected because it allows researchers to explore the types of influence used by suppliers, while simultaneously gathering an understanding of why suppliers use some forms of influence and why they do not use others. The Australian Recruitment Services Industry provides the setting for this research. The Australian Recruitment Services Industry, of which labor hire is a major element, includes more than 2700 organizations with offices at 5547 locations across Australia. The industry generates an income of more than AUD$10 billion contributing some 1.3 per cent to Gross Domestic Product (Hall, 2006) . The recruitment industry was selected as the setting of this study because: (1) researchers have characterized this industry as relationship oriented (Purcell & Purcell, 1998; Lanza, Maryn, & Elders, 2003; Kosnik, Wong-Mingji, & Hoover, 2006) . Traditionally these supply relationships had been short-term. However, more recent developments point to a range of long-term relationships between agencies and clients, including PSAs (Druker & Stanworth, 2001; Lanza et al., 2003; Kosnik et al., 2006) . Additionally, (2) accessibility was of high importance. As mentioned in the literature review, a major problem faced by prior researchers was 'lack of access.' The recruitment industry was selected to circumvent this problem. The probability of gaining access to suppliers in this industry was significantly higher than the probability of gaining access to suppliers in most other industries -there are thousands of recruitment firms in Australia. Potential participating firms were selected using an online database operated by the Recruitment and Consulting Association of Australia (RCSA), an industry body representing over 90% of recruitment firms in Australia (www.RCSA.com.au). Contact with potential participants was made in August 2007, by mail, with each potential respondent firm on the RCSA database sent an invitation letter. In total, 320 letters were sent out with each letter requesting the participation of the recruitment firm and also a meeting with the general manager of each firm. In total, 106 letters were returned representing 33% of potential participants. Out of those 106 returned letters, 20 letters or 19% were unopened -return to sender -either the business had closed down or had moved address, 26 letters or 24% were outright rejections and 60 letters or 57% offered tentative acceptances from office assistants. All potential participants -firms indicating tentative acceptances -were followed-up by phone. Meetings between the researcher and the general manager, managing director or service manager of each firm took place in October 2007. The selection process of participating firms was as follows. Supplier firms operating only ad hoc structures (36 firms) were immediately eliminated from the pool of potential participants. Ad-hoc recruitment is a low volume decentralized form of recruitment, resembling the spot market for labor. It is a trading agreement not a relationship (Webster, 1992) . The remaining suppliers (24 firms) were sorted according to the following criteria: (1) the supplier firm must have been in operation for at least 5 years, (2) the supplier agreement must have been in continuous operation for at least the last 2 years, and (3) availability. In total, 5 firms met the criteria with all 5 firms selected as participants. Key informants within each participating firm were selected by the general manager, managing director or service manager with instruction from the researcher that informants should (1) have special knowledge of the issues being researched and (2) be able and willing to communicate with the researcher (John & Reve, 1982) . In total, 17 informants were selected. Out of the 17 informants interviewed, 8 interviews were used to construct this study. Selectees included 2 managing directors, 2 general managers, 2 account managers, and 1consultant. In-depth semi-structured interviews were conducted with all participants. Semi-structured interviews required the interviewer to ask preset questions and then to probe the respondent using follow up questions. Follow up questions were not prepared in advance. Instead, these questions were asked in response to specific interviewee comments and cues. Respondents were asked pre-set questions of the following type: has your agency ever used pressure, e. Table 5 are based on the definitions found in the conceptual analysis (see Table 4 , column 2). Data was collected solely from the recruitment firm's point of view since the unit of analysis, in this study, is the supplier firm. Each interview was conducted over an average period of one and a half hours. Interviews were tape recorded and transcribed. The raw data was then gathered for analysis. Data analysis involved placing a cross section of questions and their responses onto a matrix. Content analysis was then used to elicit the main themes and sub-themes. Responses were compared, contrasted and related with similarities and differences in answers notated and positives and negatives identified, i.e. when the respondents said something and when they did not, in what context the respondents made a response and the nuances, if any.
Insert Table 5 about here A frequency analysis was then applied to the data which recorded the number of times or 'hits' each influence strategy variable, as shown in column 2 of Table 5 , is directly observed, inferred or not observed by any of the respondents. For the purposes of this research a variable is directly observed when the respondent answered 'yes' to a question asking whether or not they had used an influence strategy to increase their satisfaction in PSAs. A variable is inferred if the respondent mentions that they had used an influence strategy outside the context of the specific question asked but within the context of the general interview. Conversely, a variable is not observed or inferred when respondents indicated that they were unable to use an influence strategy to increase their satisfaction in PSAs. The results of the analysis can be found on Table 6 , in the following section. Table 6 provides a summary of the findings. As it shows, suppliers form coalitions between themselves and one department or senior manager in the buyer firm (coalitions); and go over the (buyer) manager's head (upward appeal) to improve their performance in PSAs.
Findings
Insert Table 6 about here 5.1 Pressure The findings indicate that preferred suppliers do not use pressure strategies. More precisely, none of the respondents interviewed had ever used threats, demands or frequent checking to increase their performance in PSAs and only three respondents mentioned that they had used persistent reminders for the same purposes. Suppliers mentioned that pressure strategies often resulted in a negative outcome for the supplier. Threats, demands and frequent checking decrease the buyer's and supplier's satisfaction with the PSA. This finding is consistent with the literature. Several scholars have commented on the fact that threats intensify conflict (Cadotte & Stern, 1979; Frazier & Rody, 1991) and have a negative psychological impact on the target reducing the target's dependence on the source and increasing its probability of leaving the relationship (French & Raven, 1959; Bacharach & Lawler, 1980) . As an account manager from one of the suppliers mentioned:
I would be hesitant in using that sort of approach, as I feel that you may end up getting your way but you're not going to get any further business from that side of things…The moment you start threatening, the relationship will start to unravel. The respondents mentioned that they were more inclined to use softer options based on social exchanges and mutual understanding. Social exchanges are based on social ties, trust, reciprocity and rewards (Blau, 1964) . According to respondents, these options were more likely to work as they build the relationship. As a consultant from one of the suppliers mentioned:
I would take it upon myself that if somebody is not using our services to win them over rather than forcing them to respect me. Does that make sense? You need to mend the relationship rather than put pressure on it. Overall, we find support for proposition 1. Pressure applied by suppliers is negatively linked to supplier performance.
Exchange
Before discussing these findings, it is important to mention that exchange, in this article, refers to a trade between two or more parties involving a time delimited quid pro quo. Exchange is a form of specific reciprocity -time bound, occurring in sequence, with items of close value (Keohane, 1986) .
The findings for this influence strategy are inconclusive. More precisely, half of the respondents interviewed mentioned that had used exchange to influence buyers, while the other half mentioned that they had never used it. The respondents did not provide a clear explanation for this divide. However, the literature does state that exchange can have some undesirable side effects if it appears manipulative or encourages people to expect incentives when asked to do things in the future (Yukl, Chavez, & Seifert, 2005) . The respondents who had used exchange were supportive of exchanges that combined work and personal favors/benefits. They believed that combining work and personal favors/benefits helped them to increase their performance in PSAs. Work related favors included the provision of statistics and other industry information. Personal favors included the provision of various personal favors, such as offering the client some help outside the recruitment process. As a consultant from one of the suppliers remarked:
I The relationship that developed between supplier and buyer as a result of the personal favors/benefits increased the supplier's satisfaction with the inter-firm relationship. Interestingly, the respondents from two supplier firms (out of the five firms in our sample) mentioned that their firms had implemented frequent user programs to reward buyer managers that were using the supplier's services and also to reward the accounts payable department for prompt payment. In that case, gifts, for example an IPOD, were exchanged for usage and prompt payment. This finding is consistent with the literature. Prior literature has found that rewards possess some subtle coercive qualities (John, 1984; Shaw & Condelli, 1986; Keith, Jackson, & Crosby, 1990) . Once buyer agents become used to an exchange involving personal rewards, it becomes difficult for them to switch to another supplier. The remaining respondents, i.e. the one's that reported that they had never used exchange to influence buyers, mentioned that they had ethical objections to exchanges. These respondents mentioned that their firms did not provide additional services outside the supply/recruitment process. They thought that providing high quality at a reasonable price was sufficient to satisfy the buyer. As the managing director of one of the suppliers remarked:
I think managers deal with us because they like us, they trust us, they think we're going to do a good job, not because they think they're going to get anything out of it. The findings relating to this influence strategy are not conclusive. Therefore we do not find support for proposition 2.
Coalitions
The findings indicate that preferred suppliers form some types of coalitions. The respondents interviewed mentioned that they would never consider setting up coalitions between themselves and other suppliers. Competition is too fierce for that to ever happen. They mentioned that they were worried that coalition members would use the information they gathered to undermine them in the market. As such, these types of coalitions are never associated with increased supplier satisfaction. As an account manager from one of the supplier firms reported:
You Coalitions between suppliers were definitively out of the question. However, coalitions between supplier agents and one department in the buyer firm or coalitions between supplier agents and one person in the buyer firm were quite common. According to the respondents this was one of the most effective ways of influencing managers within the buyer firm. Buyer managers were likely to ignore requests that came direct from the supplier but they were unlikely to ignore requests that came from a senior manager inside their organization. The respondents mentioned that influence over a senior buyer manager increased their satisfaction with the PSA. As the managing director of one of the supplier firms reported:
We Based on the evidence, we find partial support for proposition 3. Coalitions initiated by suppliers (between a supplier and a buyer manager/department) are positively linked to supplier performance.
Upward Appeals
The findings indicate that preferred suppliers undertake upward appeals. According to the respondents interviewed, upward appeals are an effective influence strategy. Suppliers associated the use of upward appeals with increased supplier satisfaction. The respondents mentioned that, without the threat of an upward appeal, buyer managers would ignore the supply process and follow their own way. As the managing director of one of the supplier firms mentioned:
There's no question in my mind that the way to appeal, the best way to get through, is by not imposing or reinforcing the rule directly from the supplier to the [buyer] manager. I think the [buyer] manager is in a position of power over the supplier, because they're the client. So I think the best way to get that message across is to go to the more senior manager. Then use that person to influence the manager. However, suppliers were cautious of using this strategy. Suppliers were aware that the relationship between themselves and the buyer was quite weak and that the use of upward appeals could have serious consequences for the inter-firm relationship. As the general manager of one of the supplier firms mentioned:
When my consultants are not getting the outcome from that manager's direct reports, then you've got to be careful about going over their heads. Cause when it comes back, they get a bollocking for not doing the right thing. The source of that bollocking is abundantly clear, and then that can cause you a bigger problem…
This finding has some parallels in the intra-firm influence literature. The intra-firm literature mentions that threats to go over the target's head and overt attempts at upward bypassing are likely to have unfavorable repercussions for future relationships (Yukl & Falbe, 1990) . The respondents mentioned that buyer managers on the receiving end of an upward appeal could make their lives difficult in ways that could not be easily detected or easily reported. For the supplier, the negative consequences of an upward appeal were often greater than the gains obtained by the appeal. These negative consequences decreased the supplier's satisfaction with the inter-firm relationship. We therefore found no support for proposition 4. Upward appeals undertaken by suppliers are positively linked to supplier performance.
Discussion
For two decades now scholars have researched the effects of influence within the context of inter-firm channel relationships. The evidence gathered so far suggests that non-coercive influence is positively linked to relationship performance, harmony, stability and continuity, while coercive influence is negatively linked to the same. The consensus among scholars is that strategies that tend to intimidate, solicit or 'buy out' others are ineffective in influencing others (Farrell & Shroder, 1996; Frazier & Summers, 1986) . These strategies increase the likelihood of conflict and relationship dissolution and can lead to several problems in inter-firm relationships including, retaliation by the target (those on the receiving end of the influence attempt), perceptions of the source (firms making the actual influence attempt) as exploitative and target dissatisfaction with the exchange relationship (Boyle & Dwyer, 1995; Frazier & Rody, 1991; Frazier & Summers, 1986) . Based on this evidence, scholars have advised practitioners to maximize the use of non-coercive influence strategies and to minimize or even avoid the use of coercive influence strategies within the context of their inter-firm relationships. This study is very different because it finds the opposite. In this study we find that some hard/coercive influence strategies, i.e. coalitions between the focal firm and a department or senior manager in the buyer firm (coalition) and the act of going over a (buyer) manager's head (upward appeals) are positively linked to supplier performance in PSAs. These findings are based on some unconventional research undertaken by the researchers. The unconventionality of this research focuses on the following two points. First, we adapt a set of hard intra-firm influence strategies to an inter-firm context. These alternative strategies are found in many disciplines, including but not restricted to, human resources and social psychology, and are commonly used to analyze influence attempts within firms. That is, influence attempts between a manager/team leader, peer and subordinate/employee. Second, we provide evidence that some of these influence strategies (that is, coalitions and upward appeals) are positively linked to supplier performance in inter-firm relationships. We show that these influence strategies increase supplier satisfaction in inter-firm relationships. Further, our findings imply that the use of these influence strategies increases relationship harmony, stability and continuation. The evidence presented here suggests that prior scholars may have given practitioners an incomplete picture of influence use between firms. To suggest that coercive influence is negatively linked to performance in inter-firm relationships is at best incomplete. A more accurate description of influence use between firms would suggest that a negative relationship exists between the following influence strategies: promises, threats and legalistic pleas and supplier performance in inter-firm relationships, while a positive relationship exists between the following influence strategies: coalitions and upward appeals and supplier performance in inter-firm relationships (PSAs). These findings do not deny the validity of previous studies rather they suggest that strategies are more heterogeneous than previously reported in the literature. That is, there are coercive influence strategies that hinder supplier performance in inter-firm relationships and there are hard/coercive influence strategies that aid supplier performance in inter-firm relationships. Based on these findings, we suggest that the dilemma for suppliers is one of choice. Suppliers must choose the influence strategies that aid their performance and avoid the strategies that hinder their performance. This suggestion will be of significant interest to managers and other practitioners working within the context of an inter-firm relationship. In effect, we provide managers with a road map or prescription for success based on an analysis of the hard/coercive influence strategies that work and do not work in inter-firm relationships.
Conclusions
Our study was based on two premises. First, intra-firm influence strategies are adaptable to an inter-firm context and second, supplier use of hard/coercive influence strategies is negatively linked to supplier performance. Our findings can support the first premise but cannot support the second. We provide supportive evidence of a positive link between supplier use of some hard/coercive influence strategies and supplier performance. This finding suggests that strategies are more heterogeneous than previously reported in the literature. There are coercive influence strategies that hinder supplier performance in inter-firm relationships and there are hard/coercive influence strategies that aid supplier performance in inter-firm relationships. The coercive influence strategies that hinder supplier performance are promises, threats and legalistic pleas. The hard/coercive influence strategies that aid supplier performance are coalitions and upward appeals. The dilemma for suppliers is one of choice. Suppliers must choose the influence strategies that aid their performance and avoid the strategies that hinder their performance.
Further Research
As the literature review showed, a gap was apparent in the literature. That is, soft intra-firm influence strategies have been adapted and applied to an inter-firm context but hard intra-firm influence strategies have not been adapted and applied to the same context. This study filled this gap by adapting and applying hard intra-firm influence strategies to an inter-firm context. Since the current research is based on a qualitative analysis of influence between firms, an interesting area of further research could involve a quantitative test of the model developed here. This test would quantitatively examine the role of intra-firm influence strategies on Ability to achieve influence objectives (+) Threats Ability to achieve influence objectives (-) Promises Ability to achieve influence objectives (+/-) Ingratiation Ability to achieve influence objectives (+/-) Inspirational appeal Ability to achieve influence objectives (-) Information exchange Ability to achieve influence objectives (+) Buyer's engagement focus (buyers with a higher level of task and interaction orientation)
Recommendations
Ability to achieve influence objectives (+) Threats Ability to achieve influence objectives (+/-) Promises Ability to achieve influence objectives (+/-) Ingratiation Ability to achieve influence objectives (+) Inspirational appeal Ability to achieve influence objectives (+/-) Information exchange Ability to achieve influence objectives (+) Buyer's self focus (buyers with a higher
Recommendation
Ability to achieve influence objectives (+/-) Threats Ability to achieve influence objectives (+/-) level of self orientation) Promises Ability to achieve influence objectives (+) Ingratiation Ability to achieve influence objectives (+) Inspirational appeal Ability to achieve influence objectives ( 
Exchange
Exchange strategies involve "explicit or implicit offers by an agent to provide a favor or benefit to a target in return for doing what the agent requests" (Falbe & Yukl, 1992, p. 642) .
P2.
Exchange initiated by suppliers is negatively linked to supplier performance.
Coalitions
With coalition strategies, an agent "enlists the aid or endorsement of other people to influence a target to do what the agent wants" (Falbe & Yukl, 1992, p. 643) . 
At the outset, it is important to mention that in this context

Upward Appeals
Upward appeals are an attempt to invoke the authority and power of higher management by (a) telling the target you are acting on behalf of higher management, (b) threatening to go over the target's head or (c) directly asking superiors to help you influence the target (Yukl & Falbe, 1990, p. 135) .
P4.
Upward appeals undertaken by suppliers are negatively linked to supplier performance.
1. List of influence strategies based on Yukl & Falbe (1990) 2. Definitions of influence strategies based on Falbe & Yukl (1992) 3. List of predictions/propositions based on the literature review 
